Volume 42 | Number 1 Fall 2006
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I. Introduction
In the post-9/11 world, the Middle East has gained special importance. Unfortunately, given the limited availability of education about international issues in the American education system and media, the nation in general is relatively ignorant about Middle Eastern countries. Undoubtedly, ignorance leads to unjust prejudice and discrimination. Some view all Muslims as terrorists and all countries in the Middle East as fundamentalist regimes and supporters of terrorism.
During an interview discussing the role that Shari’a law will play in the new government of Iraq, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that there would be an Islamic Republic in Iraq “as there are other Islamic Republics—Turkey and Pakistan.”1 This statement of a high-level U.S. official labeling Turkey, a strictly secular and democratic country, an “Islamic Republic” exemplifies the lack of knowledge in the Western world about Middle Eastern countries. In an attempt to remedy this widespread ignorance, this Article provides a comparative look at secularism in the legal system of one of the most unique countries in the Middle East, the Republic of Turkey.
Muslims make up ninety-nine percent of Turkey’s population.2 Contrary to popular Western belief that all majority-Muslim3 states are theocracies, Turkey is a democratic and secular state. Among the fifty-two majority-Muslim states, the constitutions of only two countries, Turkey and Senegal, prescribe secularism.4 Indeed, as this Article discusses in Part II, the Turkish version of secularism is arguably the strictest version of secularism implemented by any nation.5
“Turkey’s ability to maintain a secular democratic state in a region of the world with rising Islamic fundamentalism has allowed it to maintain very strong connections to Europe and the United States.”6 In May 2005, during a Capitol Hill Hearing on the state of U.S.-Turkish Relations, Representative Robert Wexler (DFL) stated: “There is no greater friend [in the Middle East] to the United States than Turkey when it comes to defending the values of freedom . . . .”7 Europe values the Republic of Turkey “not just for where it is but for what it is.”8 Turkey’s secular order not only protects the democratic system of the Turkish Republic itself, but also serves as a barrier between the rest of the Western world and the continuously spreading threat of Islamic fundamentalism from the Middle East.
Turkey is also of special importance to the United States and Europe because of its strategic geographic location from an economic and military perspective. Turkey is situated “at the crossroads between eastern Europe, central Asia and the Middle East.”9 Furthermore, Turkey is “the only NATO member state to border Iran, Iraq, Syria, and two former Soviet states.”10 Consequently, “[o]nly Turkey lies either close to or at the center of most of the gravest threats to Europe’s peace and well-being.”11 As a result, Turkey’s strict secular legal system, in a region filled with fundamentalist regimes and Islamic terrorism, is an essential protector of one of the United States’ and Europe’s greatest allies.
Additionally, Turkey, as a secular and democratic majority-Muslim state, provides answers to many of the questions Americans ask as the United States is striving to instill democracy into Middle Eastern nations like Iraq.12 Can a majority-Muslim state also be democratic?13 Can women stand on equal footing with men in the legal system of a majority-Muslim state? Can democracy, even if forcefully implemented, stand the test of time? As this Article demonstrates, the history and the legal system of the Turkish Republic provide an affirmative answer to all of the foregoing questions.
Even though Turkey has accomplished the difficult task of maintaining a democracy in a majority-Muslim state, it is widely criticized in U.S. law review articles for a number of reasons.14 Most of these criticisms are outside the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, it is important, when reading or writing about Turkey, to base one’s conclusions on justified and objective observations, and to take what has been written with a grain of salt. In 1923, an American student wrote to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,15 the founder of the Republic of Turkey, and asked for an autographed picture and reply.16 Atatürk wrote back and stated: “My advice to intelligent and studious American children is not to believe as true anything they hear about Turks, but to carefully base their views on scientific and substantive research.”17 Thus, our goal in this Article, following Atatürk’s words, is to provide observations into the secular legal system of Turkey, basing all of our conclusions on, not myths, but legal documents, facts, and interviews we conducted in Turkey.
This Article examines, in six major parts, the past, present, and future of secularism in the Republic of Turkey. Part II of the Article provides an overview of the principle of secularism generally, and in Turkey specifically, and describes how Turkish secularism differs from the Western notion of secularism. Part III discusses the role of religion in the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor to the modern day Turkey, in order to provide a background for the legal developments that occurred after the Empire’s collapse. Part IV outlines the reforms that Atatürk and his supporters implemented following the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and demonstrates how a fundamentalist empire became a strictly secular government in less than twenty years. Part V provides a thorough examination of the various provisions of the Turkish Constitution that relate to secularism. Part VI demonstrates the application of the principle of secularism in Turkey by discussing the legal history of the ban against the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in Turkish educational institutions. This Part also analyzes the November 10, 2005 decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey.18 Finally, Part VII speculates on the future of secularism in Turkey and discusses whether it is possible to implement any fundamental changes in the regime.