Volume 43 | Number 2 Spring 2008
Clientelism in Argentina: Piqueteros and Relief Payment Plans for the Unemployed—Misunderstanding the Role of Civil Society
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It is a working day like any other in the City of Buenos Aires. Parked buses line one of the flanks of 9 de Julio Avenue. In the center of the avenue, hundreds of people are concentrated, holding signs and flags that identify them with their respective organizations. Small groups surround their leaders and wait to be called upon to confirm their attendance. Men and women, old and young, even children and mothers pushing baby strollers, patiently wait their turns to start marching towards the Pink House (where the president is). Or maybe today’s destination is the Congress or the Ministry of Labor. It does not really matter any more.
Most of the people present receive some government relief—what they call the “plans”—for being unemployed. They are supposed to be working in return, but there is no work for them to do. Instead they are asked to participate in protests. People who are hungry and destitute but do not have one of these plans hope to get one. To do so, they know they have to demonstrate their faithful commitment to the cause. Participation in the protests is crucial. There is nothing better to do, anyway—they have no jobs to attend. For the younger ones, their schools will not provide any food for the day; in any case, they wouldn’t want to miss the thrill of being part of “the people.”
A man in a suit and tie walks by, keeping a respectful distance and stealing glances at the columns of people. In his hand is a suitcase full of papers; in his eyes, a mix of fear, pity, and fatigue. In the center of the Avenue, under the shadow of the “obelisco” monument, a dark column of strong black smoke rises. The stink of burned tires surrounds the city. There is no traffic and the silence is consumed by the chants of protesters that have slowly started to march to the rhythm of the violent and monotonous bang of the drums. At the front of the column, a line of men marches in a military fashion. They have their faces covered with black handkerchiefs and they hold menacing canes painted with the desire to strike frustration away.
The cars, stopped at various intersections, patiently wait for the column to pass. The police loosely hold the line of waiting cars going nowhere. This is nothing new. It is a day like any other working day in Buenos Aires.1
I. Introduction
Most Latin American countries have overcome military disruptions and are now well-established democracies. Nevertheless, electoral continuity and fairness are not enough to guarantee that democratic institutions function properly and fairly. A simple inquiry into the region’s situation reveals the entrenchment of corrupt governments, the growth of inequality, and the deepening poverty and unemployment. This is also the case in Argentina.
Many authors have argued that civic engagement is the solution to the profound crisis the new Latin American democracies are undergoing. It has been suggested that the activity of nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”)2 leads inexorably to a better democracy and “to the creation of a vibrant and participatory civil society in which all groups, including the poor and dispossessed, play an active role.”3 It has also been argued that NGOs have the advantage of a “close proximity to the poor.”4 In effect, the continuous activity of NGOs inevitably draws members into participatory practices, thereby reinforcing democracy. Supporters claim that NGOs hold a key role in the process of reforming democratic institutions, as they identify the needs of, and serve as a voice for, the public.5 Some scholars characterize NGOs as “manifestations” of the community where they are rooted.6 Civil society organizations are similarly described by some as the expression of the concentrated exercise of political rights by members of society.7 These individual voices, concentrated in a gigantic public megaphone, gain enough power to be heard in the spheres of the government and other social actors.
The global influence of NGOs is growing exponentially. NGOs registered in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) countries almost doubled between 1980 and 1993, rising from 1,600 to 2,970 during that time.8 Similarly, spending by these groups over the same time period increased from $2.8 billion to $5.7 billion.9 A United Nations report estimated that by 1995 the number of international NGOs was nearly 29,000, while The Economist estimated that in the year 2000 there were two million of these groups in the United States alone.10 Similar growth rates are reported in the developing world: Debora Spar and James Dail have identified that in Nepal, for example, the number of registered NGOs rose from 220 in 1990 to 1,210 in 1993, and in Kenya a reported 240 NGOs are created every year.11
Without a doubt, civil society’s role is fundamental in improving government accountability and strengthening the rule of law. The example described in this paper, however, shows a situation where civil society actors have failed to show the miraculous positive effects normally attributed to them. In fact, it illustrates important negative effects generated by the involvement of these organizations.
In particular, this paper analyzes certain welfare practices currently in place in Argentina as an example of overinvolvement of civil society actors in public affairs. It is hoped this analysis will show how these welfare practices neutralize the potential for holding NGOs accountable. In effect, this paper will describe the manner in which improper allocation of the management of certain unemployment welfare benefits has diminished the opportunities for positive interaction between the state and a particular civil society group known as the “piqueteros” (an association of various groups of unemployed people). This description will explain how these civil society groups have been politically manipulated through the exchange of unemployment benefits for political favors. The situation in Argentina illustrates how opening up opportunities for manipulation of funding sources can undermine the impartiality of civil society actors and generate an enormous incentive for corrupt practices.
But situations like the one described in this paper do not imply that the hope placed in the role of civil society is an empty one. Particularly in developing countries, NGOs have played an invaluable role in acting as the watchdogs of civil society, alerting others when governments go beyond the limits imposed by law. They have proven useful for defending human rights and achieving further governmental accountability, acting as instruments of relief for the problems of minorities. It is clear that problems, such as the one examined here, involve only a few NGOs. The valuable role of NGOs in society cannot be disputed. But specific measures should be taken to ensure they can properly carry out their role. Otherwise, NGOs can become an incredibly powerful instrument of corruption.
It will also be argued that the utilization of NGOs is not always the best choice—these organizations do not provide a magic solution. The manipulation of social benefits in Argentina through the use of NGOs, like the piquetero organizations, shows the importance of respecting certain limits. Sometimes, too much involvement, especially when extended to “management activities,” can generate improper incentives and destroy the potential advantages of action by NGOs. In these cases, NGO involvement should not be taken further than the role of guardian. Furthermore, the overutilization of these actors in developing countries sometimes works against democracy and creates mechanisms that undermine economic growth and social development. I will try to explain the reasons for these failures and offer some proposals that would help avoid this deviation from the NGOs’ proper role in the future.
Sections II and III of this paper analyze the sociopolitical environment in Argentina in order to set the context of the current piqueteros phenomenon. The first section covers the period from the beginnings of the nation to the return of democracy in 1983. The second section covers the period from 1983 to the present. The purpose of the historical description is to show how Argentina laboriously returned to a democratic regime in the 1980s, and to present the current socioeconomic situation of its population. The data provided show the reestablishment of democratic rule has not provided prosperity and social equality. In fact, the socioeconomic picture has deteriorated profoundly under the democratic regime.
Section IV explains how the piquetero movement became the massive force it is today. This section also discusses how the piqueteros came to manage a number of unemployment benefits, and how this situation neutralizes and corrupts the performance of these civil society actors.
Section V tries to provide some answers to the question of how civil society actors, like the piquetero movement, could fail in their role as democratic enhancers and otherwise become involved in clientelistic12 and corrupt practices. It will be argued that this improper involvement in welfare policies could be an additional factor in the decline of the national psyche. I conclude with some generic proposals to shift the current incentives in the right direction.