Volume 43 | Number 2 Spring 2008
Clientelism in Argentina: Piqueteros and Relief Payment Plans for the Unemployed—Misunderstanding the Role of Civil Society
VI. Conclusions on the Participation of NGOs in Welfare Policy
The piquetero problem shows an example of failure in the use of NGOs. More efficient accountability controls, although useful, would only be a limited solution for the case presented because transparency will not eliminate the harmful incentives that are currently in place.
In accountability actions—where NGOs act merely as controllers of the execution of public policy—the use of NGOs can be undoubtedly valuable. However, when these organizations are utilized for management activities—that is, where NGOs receive and manage public funds for the application of public programs—there is a greater risk of deviation from their proper incentives.
If one role of civil society actors is to hold other bodies accountable, they must maintain autonomy, particularly from those they serve to check. The most obvious opportunity for the breach of this autonomy occurs when the civil society actors become dependent on government bodies for financial support. Because of this dynamic, NGOs should generally not be given management functions in the implementation of welfare policy. As suggested by the contract-failure theories—that the greatest value of NGOs is based on their trustworthiness—this conclusion is strongest with regard to developing countries. The use of NGOs for management actions in developing countries is likely—as in the case of the piqueteros—to generate problematic incentives, thus leading to clientelistism and other corrupt practices.
VII. Final Words
As shown in the first and second part, Argentina overcame more than fifty years of political turbulence and to return to democracy. Despite the social and political crises suffered during the 1980s and 1990s, the country proved that it has a well-established electoral continuity. Nevertheless, as shown in the third section, Argentina’s democracy is not doing well. Poverty has increased exponentially, inequality is deeply entrenched, and, as in many other Latin American countries, its institutions suffer from a rotting corruption at all levels. As Susan Rose-Ackerman states, “[w]idespread corruption is a symptom of a poorly functioning state.”299 Similarly, in the words of Daniel Poneman,
[T]hose who speak of the return of democracy in Argentina misstep. Democracy has never truly existed there. It must be established, which is vastly more difficult. The task is not merely to revive a familiar or respected system, but to reverse the long Argentine tradition against democracy and in favor of caudillismo, plotting, knavery, and violence. Reformation, not restoration, is needed. . . . Only a sea change in attitudes will bring a long-term perspective to Argentina.300
Even a well-established electoral continuity is not sufficient to guarantee the well-being of the constituencies when corrupt practices are so entrenched. Corruption is an illness that tampers with the basic functions of democratic institutions, and pervasive corruption undermines the basis of a government’s legitimacy. When citizens lose faith in political and legal institutions, they may become cynical or even rebel.301 Democracy’s fundamental contribution—that political authority comes from each and every member of society—can be eroded to the point of disappearing. In other words, the survival of the system could be at stake.302 This is exactly the situation in Argentina.
If you would like to submit a response to this article, please read our submission guidelines and submit your response here.
Footnotes
For complete footnote citations, download the PDF.