Journal

Volume 43 | Number 2 Spring 2008

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Upholding Human Rights in the Hemisphere:  Casting Down Impunity Through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

by Morse H. Tan

Abstract

This article further fills the lacuna in the scholarly literature regarding compliance theory and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  It builds upon a previous publication by this same author titled “Member State Compliance with the Judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.” Like its predecessor, this Article explores various prominent theoretical models including the managerial model, fairness and legitimacy, transnational legal process, and self-interest.  Harmonizing aspects of these distinctive theoretical models as an analytical base, this Article proposes a new, hybrid model which suggests that many of the central tenets of the previous theories reflect reconcilable dimensions of compliance with the Court’s judgments rather than representing an ineluctable, theoretical conflict.

This new hybrid model has been developed in the context of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ early jurisprudence on the merits:  the hybrid model finds application in the Court’s first decisions in contentious cases, which constitute the critical corpus of precedent upon which its growing caseload, legitimacy and authority have been built.  The Article’s focus allows its conclusions to be tailored specifically to the Inter-American system to bring greater comprehension of international law compliance in our hemisphere specifically, as well as contributing to the ongoing theoretical discussion of compliance theory.

Summary

  1. Introduction
  2. Brief History and Structural Analysis
    1. Velásquez Rodríguez
      1. Narrative
      2. Judgment on the Merits
      3. Form and Amount
      4. Commission and Government
    2. Godínez Cruz
      1. Narrative
      2. Judgment on the Merits
    3. Clarification of the Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases
      1. Compliance in the Aftermath of the Clarification
      2. Closing of the Cases
    4. Aloeboetoe
      1. Narrative
      2. Judgment on the Merits
      3. Compliance with Aloeboetoe
      4. Closing the Case
    5. Gangaram Panday
      1. Narrative
      2. Judgment on the Merits
      3. Compliance with Gangaram Panday
    6. El Amparo
      1. Narrative
      2. Judgment on the Merits
      3. Reparations
      4. Compliance with El Amparo
    7. Neira Alegría
      1. Narrative
      2. Judgment on the Merits
      3. Indemnification
      4. Reparations
      5. Compliance with Neira Alegría
    8. Caballero-Delgado y Santana
      1. Narrative
      2. Judgment on the Merits
      3. Judicial Proceedings
      4. Compensation
      5. Compliance with Caballero-Delgado y Santana
    9. Suárez-Rosero
      1. Facts
      2. Judgment on the Merits
      3. Investigation
      4. Indemnity
      5. Reparations
      6. Interpretation
  3. Compliance Theory and the Court
    1. Why Do Nations Obey International Law?
      1. The Managerial Model
      2. Inherent Fairness
      3. Transnational Legal Process
      4. Self-Interest
      5. Cultural Homogeneity and Conformity with Broader Human Rights Schemes
    2. Synthesis of the Frameworks: How Do They Apply to the IACHR?
      1. The Ability of the States to Influence the Shape of the Court
        1. Composition of the Tribunal
        2. Caseload and Functional Capacity of the Court
        3. Capacity for Independent Fact-Finding
        4. The Court’’s Formal Authority to Enforce the American Convention
      2. The Interplay of State Influence on the Court with External Factors Out of State Control
      3. The Perception of Fairness and Legitimacy in the Court’’s Decisions
  4. Conclusion: Future of the Court

Footnotes

For complete footnote citations, download the PDF.

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